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TAX COURT APPOINTMENTS AND REAPPOINTMENTS:
IMPROVING THE PROCESS
Danshera Cords *
This article explores the problems with the appointment
and reappointment process of judges to the United States
Tax Court, particularly focusing on the recent politicization
of the process. Until 1992, the process ensured the appoint-
ment of only well-qualified judges to the Tax Court bench.
However, beginning with the administrations of Presidents
William J. Clinton and George W. Bush, the President in-
fused politics into the nomination process, causing the pro-
cess to slow and creating vacancies on the court. Such de-
lays threaten the court's effectiveness and disrupt its
operations. To solve this problem, the author endorses
changing the statute to allow Tax Court judges whose terms
have expired but who have expressed a desire to be reap-
pointed to be recalled with the same rights and duties as a
Tax Court judge, unless the President indicates that the po-
sition will be left vacant or filled with another nominee.
I. INTRODUCTION
The partisanship of the current political dialog coupled with
the constant news cycle results in an increasingly rancorous dis-
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course about government, law, and the judicial process. Judicial
appointments have become increasingly politicized. This politici-
zation places the judicial appointment process at the mercy of pol-
itics more than any other time in recent history. The appearance
of an increasingly politicized judicial appointment process is
troubling as the judicial branch of government is intended to re-
main above the political fray.
Court watchers note that increasingly bitter partisan battles
make navigating the judicial appointment process ever more dif-
ficult. The Republicans and Democrats wage increasingly hostile
battles along ideological lines to keep the judiciary free of judges
whom the parties find objectionable for political and moral rea-
sons.' One can see the concern over ideology throughout the judi-
cial appointment process-presidential nomination, Senate ad-
vice and consent, and confirmation. Fierce battles arise
particularly when different parties control the Presidency and the
Senate.! The partisanship is not isolated to either branch. While
Presidents seek to appoint judges who will support their philo-
sophical approaches to governance, the party controlling the Sen-
ate seeks to limit the influence of the other party's ideology in the
judiciary. The tension between the parties manifests itself in
slower appointments to the bench, regardless of which Senate
committee investigates and oversees the advice and consent pro-
3cess.
These controversies played out repeatedly in the confirmation
hearings during the administrations of Presidents William J.
Clinton and George W. Bush, with respect to nominees to fill va-
1. See Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, Contentious Federal Judicial Nominations,
State Court Elections the Focus of Next ABA President (Aug. 11, 2008), available at http:
//www.abanon.org/2008/08/contentious-fedeal-judicial-nominations-state-court-elections-fo
cus-of-next-aba-president/. In 2008, the incoming president for the American Bar Associa-
tion noted this as an ongoing and systematic problem facing the judiciary. Id. He cited the
existence of "a nomination and confirmation process for federal judges that 'too often in-
volves lengthy, partisan conflict and delay,' [and] . . . strongly backed prospective associa-
tion policy that offers new ways to address the problem." Id.
2. See S. Comm. on Rules & Administration, 112th Cong., Rules of the Senate R.
XXII (2011) [hereinafter Senate Rules] (explaining that even when one party nominally
controls the Senate and White House without a sufficiently large margin in the Senate,
the other party may effectively block nominees it perceives as undesirable with actual or
threatened filibusters).
* 3. The United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary vets the nominees to most
federal courts. Id. at R. XXV(1)(L)(5). Then, if approved, the nominations are sent to the
Senate floor for a vote. Id. However, the United States Committee on Finance provides the
first screening of nominees to the Tax Court. Id. at R. XXV(1)(i).
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cancies in the United States district courts, United States courts
of appeals, and, most visibly, loudly, and publicly, the Supreme
Court of the United States.! Even more recently, the length and
depth of the ideological and partisan divide were manifest during
the confirmation process of Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, following her Sep-
tember 2009 nomination by President Barack Obama to replace
retiring Associate Justice David Souter on the Supreme Court of
the United States.' However, this battle affects not only the Arti-
cle III courts but also the nomination and confirmation of judicial
officers to Article I courts, such as the United States Tax Court
(the "Tax Court").
Indeed, both sides of the aisle acknowledge a problem exists
with the judicial appointment process. Moreover, many non-
political organizations, including the Judicial Conference of the
United States, consider the current number of judicial vacancies
a crisis.' Many assert that partisanship has no place in judicial
4. See generally Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting out of Nomina-
tion and Advice and Consent, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 785 (2006) (discussing the nominations
of Justices Miles, Alito, and Roberts and arguing for a "merit-based approach to federal
judicial selection that avoids undue emphasis on securing particular outcomes on specific
issues"); Carl Tobias, Filling Federal Appellate Vacancies, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 829, 839-47
(2009) (discussing the nomination and approval processes of federal judges during the
Clinton and Bush administrations).
5. See Partisan Confirmation Hearings Expected for Sotomayor, CNN POLITICS (May
27, 2009, 8:45 AM), www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/26/sotomayor.reax/index.html?iref
=allsearch#cnnSTCTEXT; Kathy Kiely, Republican Support for Sotomayor Looks Paltry,
USA TODAY (Aug. 4, 2009, 3:00 PM), www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2009-
08-03-sotomayor-N.htm. See generally Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Confirmation Hearings, 102d Cong. (1992)
(including Senators' statements and testimony of nominees).
6. See Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem
and Possible Solutions, 14 MiSs. C. L. REV. 319, 319 (1994) (discussing judicial emergen-
cies created by vacancies in judgeships). Currently the Article III courts, which include the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of Appeals, the United States district
courts, and the Court of International Trade, have 874 total combined judgeships. Federal
Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov./JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudge
ships.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2011). Included in this total number are ten temporary
judgeships authorized for the district courts. U.S. District Courts Authorized Temporary
Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/viewer.aspx?
Doc=/uscourts/JudgesandJudgeships/doc/districttemp.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2011). The
Article I courts have far fewer authorized judgeships with four in the territorial courts,
sixteen in the Federal Court of Claims, and seven in the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2006) (stating that the United States Court of Federal Claim
consists of sixteen judges); 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2010) (2006) (discussing
the makeup of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims); 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424(a), 1614(a),
1821(a) (2006) (discussing the composition of the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Is-
lands, and the Northern Marina Islands). There are currently nineteen members on the
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appointments and whether the Senate should confirm a nominee
differs greatly from the question of whether individual Senators
would select the nominee.! Instead, the determination should
simply be whether the nominee possesses the qualifications to
properly fulfill the duties of the office.
However, resolving all tensions in the advice and consent pro-
cess would probably introduce other problems to the judicial sys-
tem. Moreover, these tensions provide a check and balance by
preventing any one group from gaining too much power and en-
suring that the minority always has an opportunity to prevent
the majority from imposing their views on the populace as a
whole. It is unlikely that all who express concern about the cur-
rent state of affairs would agree on a single global solution, and a
single solution does not need to be achieved.
This article considers a smaller part of the overall confirmation
battle, that is, the issues surrounding the appointment and reap-
pointment of judges to the Tax Court. Until recently, Tax Court
appointments, which are made by Presidential nomination and
confirmed by the Senate "solely on the grounds of fitness to per-
form the duties of the office,"' were seldom controversial as long
as the nominee possessed the qualifications to perform the job. In
recent years, presidential nominations to the Tax Court and Sen-
ate consideration have occurred at a slower rate. These delays
cannot be blamed on a backlog in the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee because initial Senate consideration goes through the Senate
Finance Committee. These appointments are very important eco-
nomically, societally, and judicially, and like other federal judicial
appointments, appointments and reappointments to the Tax
Court bench have suffered substantial delays. Unlike Article III
courts, which require a single appointment because the judges
have life tenure, Tax Court judges serve fifteen-year terms. This
Tax Court. I.R.C. § 7443(a) (2006).
7. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Committee Approves Kagan's Nomination to Supreme
Court, THE CAUCUS (July 20, 2010, 12:09 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
07/20/judicial-committee-approves-kagans-nomination-to-supreme-court (discussing the
Senate Judiciary Committee's 13-6 approval of Elena Kagan's nomination and quoting
Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican senator from South Carolina, saying "[tihe Consti-
tution in my view puts a requirement on me not to replace my judgment for [President
Obama's]") (internal quotation marks omitted). Senator Graham noted a change over time
in the standard from "whether [the judicial nominees were] qualified and of good charac-
ter" to a standard that also permitted consideration of judicial philosophy. Id.
8. I.R.C. § 7443(b) (2006).
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finite term potentially allows not only an initial appointment but
also a subsequent reappointment at the expiration of the judge's
term, unless the sitting President wishes to replace the judge
with another appointee or the judge no longer wishes to remain
on the bench.'
Because of the fixed fifteen-year terms, vacancies in Tax Court
judgeships occur at relatively predictable times, allowing plan-
ning in most cases. Thus, the problems associated with expired
terms and vacancies in Tax Court judgeships could be avoided
more easily than in the context of Article III courts, even without
considering the differences in the appointment procedure between
the two.
Moreover, fewer divisive issues should exist with respect to ap-
pointments to specialized courts with limited jurisdiction and
shorter judicial terms than appointments to Article III courts
with more general jurisdiction and life tenure. In the context of
the district courts, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court of
the United States, individual senators or political caucuses some-
times decide to block a nominee's appointment based on political
litmus tests. In these cases, the source of concern is generally
that the nominee does or does not subscribe to a particular ideol-
ogy and, therefore, may or may not uphold certain precedent, de-
cide cases as an activist jurist, or apply a very strict construction
of the law, depending on the views of the party seeking to block
the appointment.'o
9. Compare U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 (allowing judges to indefinitely hold "their
[o]ffices during good [blehavior"), with I.R.C. § 7443(e) (limiting the term of a presidential-
ly appointed tax court judge to fifteen years). However, Internal Revenue Code §
7447(b)(3) notes that a presidentially appointed Tax Court judge may request reappoint-
ment not more than nine months before the expiration of the judge's term nor less than six
months before the expiration of the term. I.R.C. § 7447(b)(3). Thus, requests for reap-
pointment are expected and, among judges who are not seeking to retire or enter senior
status, such requests are frequently made. As will be more fully developed, many judges
request and receive second terms as presidentially appointed judges of the Tax Court, but
the frequency with which such requests are granted is declining in recent years. Certainly
other operational differences exist, including the nature of the power each court may exer-
cise, because Article I courts as legislative constructs have only those powers specifically
created by Congress, while Article III courts possess all of the traditional powers inherent
in the judiciary. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges,
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (discussing the importance of considering a judicial
nominee's ideology and how it will influence his decision making). One of the most fre-
quently identified concerns is Roe v. Wade and its progeny, relating to abortion rights. 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
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Nominees to the Tax Court usually possess impeccable creden-
tials. Specifically, nominees most frequently come from a back-
ground of either public or private tax practice. Many nominees'
backgrounds include both practice areas with their prior em-
ployment including a combination of private law or accounting
firms, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS"), the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Tax Division, or one of the tax-writing legislative
staffs. Of course, exceptions to these generalizations exist, which
allow the advice and consent process to add value by discovering
and eliminating unqualified nominees.
This article concludes that the current process for identifying,
nominating, and confirming new judges to the Tax Court largely
works to ensure the appointment of well-qualified judges. Addi-
tionally, in most instances, the reappointment process ultimately
arrives at the right result. However, since 1992, the reappoint-
ment process has increasingly interfered with the efficient opera-
tion of the court, possibly eroding confidence in the court's effec-
tiveness.
During this period, timely appointments and reappointments
to the Tax Court became increasingly less likely, causing disrup-
tions in the court's operations. In some instances, nominations
were more political than practical and, thus, disregarded the need
for nominees to possess the requisite qualifications and experi-
ence. The political nature of presidential appointments and the
process for their confirmation constitutes a symptom rather than
the ultimate problem. Therefore, removing politics from the pro-
cess may not constitute the solution. Rather, the solution requires
more careful consideration of the effect the timing of the ap-
pointments and reappointments of Tax Court judges has on the
judicial process, the effective administration of the court, and the
outcomes for the litigants who filed their claims with the Tax
Court.
Recent experience shows that the processes for reappointing
Tax Court judges at the conclusion of a fifteen-year term poten-
tially discounts the value of merit and experience in favor of less
relevant political considerations. Moreover, the disruptions in
Tax Court operations may harm the court's effectiveness, result
in less well-developed law, and cause financial harm to taxpayers
when reduced judicial resources delay their cases.
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As a result, this article advocates a change to the statute gov-
erning the Tax Court. This article proposes that at the expiration
of a judge's term, if the judge has not been reappointed and no
successor has been appointed, then the eligible judge should be
permitted to retain the privileges of a Tax Court judge until the
President nominates and the Senate confirms a successor. At that
time, the former judge could, subject to the discretion of the chief
judge of the Tax Court, assume the status of senior judge.
Additionally, this proposal allows the Tax Court to avoid prob-
lems arising out of delays in the political process that have be-
come the norm over the last five presidential terms. This proposal
provides the sitting President with the same freedom to replace
Tax Court judges allowed by current law, comports with the Ap-
pointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and allows for maxi-
mum flexibility in staffing the court. As discussed, this solution
also resolves the problems caused by the long delays in appoint-
ing and reappointing Tax Court judges created during the last
three presidential administrations, allowing the Tax Court to
more effectively meet taxpayers' needs and carry out its responsi-
bilities.
Part II of this article discusses the Tax Court's structure, along
with its constitutional and statutory makeup. Part III explains
the history of appointments and reappointments to the Tax Court
and its predecessors. Next, Part IV discusses recent nominations
of new judges and nominations to reappoint sitting judges. This
discussion demonstrates that the appointment process currently
serves its purpose as a gatekeeper, ensuring that only well-
qualified judges receive appointments to the Tax Court. This dis-
cussion also demonstrates the manner in which recent presiden-
tial administrations approached reappointments and how these
methods have disrupted the Tax Court's operations to the detri-
ment of taxpayers. Part V recommends changes to the reap-
pointment process to ensure qualified, experienced Tax Court
judges are retained and prevent unnecessary vacancies that re-
sult only from the passing of a fixed period of time. This solution
allows qualified judges to continue to perform all, rather than on-
ly some, of the duties required of a Tax Court judge until the
nomination and advice and consent process produces an appro-
priate replacement. This provision provides the President with
maximum flexibility in choosing appointees, while ensuring par-
tisan bickering causes no harm to the Tax Court.
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This article explores two additional alternative solutions, alt-
hough both face substantial obstacles, including potential consti-
tutional challenges. The first alternative solution would allow
judges serving in good standing-those who are able to serve at
least half of a second term before reaching retirement age and al-
so satisfy other criteria-to receive a rebuttable presumption of
reappointment. The second alternative would extend the initial
term for Tax Court judges to twenty years. While not entirely
eliminating the problem, increasing the initial term would result
in less disruption to the Tax Court's operation than the approach
used by either of the past two presidential administrations and
would reduce the number of instances in which reappointment is
an issue. Lastly, Part VI discusses the reasons for disfavoring
these alternatives.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE I COURTS AND THE
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE TAX COURT
A. Article I Courts Generally
Article I courts derive their power from a legislative delegation
of judicial power pursuant to Article I and not from Article III of
the U.S. Constitution." Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitu-
tion permits Congress to "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court." 2 This authority contrasts with the creation of
the judiciary in Article III of the Constitution stating:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9. While discussing territorial and legislative courts, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Williams v. United States noted that "[t]he jurisdic-
tion, . . . with which [the courts] are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is
defined in the [Article III] of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execu-
tion of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United
States." 289 U.S. 553, 565 (1933) (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Carter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546
(1828)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court interpreted that statement to mean
"that the courts of the territories (and, of course, other legislative courts) are invested with
judicial power, but . .. this power is not conferred by [Article III] of the Constitution, but
by Congress in the execution of other provisions of that instrument." Id. at 565-66.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Of-
fice."
Current examples of Article I courts include the Tax Court,14 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces," and the
United States Court of Federal Claims." The judges sitting on
each of these courts enjoy a fifteen-year tenure. 7
Specialized Article I courts create unique opportunities for
judges to provide added value by working in an area of expertise.
This specialization creates the potential for greater efficiency but
also gives rise to legitimate concerns that the agency with which
the judges interact most frequently may interfere with the inde-
pendence of judges' decision making.'" Notwithstanding the po-
tential for better decision making, critics raise a number of con-
cerns about specialized courts that include the possibility that
repetitive subject matter or specific issue decision making results
13. Id. art. III. § 1.
14. I.R.C. § 7441 (2006).
15. 10 U.S.C. § 941 (2006).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 171(a). In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., the Supreme Court of the United States declared the bankruptcy courts, which were
established under the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, unconstitutional. 458 U.S. 50, 53, 76 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (citing the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1976)). To satis-
fy the constitutional concerns raised in that case, Congress reconfigured the bankruptcy
courts when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code, making the bankruptcy courts part of the
local United States district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). Bankruptcy Courts, unlike the
Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Services,
have judges appointed for only fourteen years. Id. § 152(a)(1).
17. 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(2) (United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); I.R.C.
§ 7443(e) (Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 172(a) (United States Court of Federal Claims). A Tax
Court judge may only be removed from office by the President, after notice and opportuni-
ty for public hearing, for inefficiency, neglecting the judge's duties, or committing malfea-
sance in office. I.R.C. § 7443(f. In addition, a judge removed from office pursuant to §
7443(f) is barred from practicing before the Tax Court. Id. § 7443(g). However, no judge
has ever been removed from the Tax Court bench. James Edward Maule, Instant Replay,
Weak Terms, and Disputed Calls: An Empirical Study of Alleged Tax Court Judge Bias, 66
TENN. L. REV. 351, 406 (1999).
18. Maule, supra note 17, at 354-62; see also John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Pa-
tents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1253-54 (2010) (acknowledging concern that the federal cir-
cuit would become captured by the patent bar); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Im-
migration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1695 (2010) (discussing the concerns for
capture in specialized courts); Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World,
50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1755, 1767 (1997) ("[The generalist judge is less likely to become the
victim of regulatory capture than her specialized counterpart, despite the best of inten-
tions on the latter's side.").
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in monotony for the judges, thus reducing the quality of the po-
tential judicial candidate pool.
In the context of all federal judicial appointments, the most
important and harmful effect of the confirmation process is not
the loss of civility or the potential for moving toward ideological
litmus tests in appointing life tenure judges. Although both are
certainly harmful, the most tragic consequence is the effect of
these debates on the judiciary, the courts, and ultimately justice
itself. Justice may be increasingly impinged upon as the politics
of the process hold up more appointments and fill fewer vacan-
cies, increasingly delaying access to the courts.20
Although they usually do not garner the same attention in the
specialized courts, such controversies in judicial appointments
are not unique to the Article III courts.2' Ideological divides have
increasingly affected nominees to the Article I courts, including
the Tax Court.22 President George W. Bush used nominations to
Article I courts as rewards to party faithfuls, without adequate
consideration of institutional needs.23 As in Article III courts,
holdups in the confirmation process for Article I courts mean un-
filled vacancies and result in delayed justice for parties coming
before the courts.
One significant difference between the two types of courts is
that Article I judges do not have the protection of lifetime tenure
enjoyed by the judges of Article III courts. Under current law, Tax
Court judges serve terms of fifteen years with the possibility of
19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 254
(1996); Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Mas-
ters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 692-93
(2002) (discussing concerns that commentators have expressed regarding prestige among
jurists sitting on specialized courts); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (citing RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 150-57 (1985)); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 71-72 (1995).
20. See, e.g., Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 2010 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 2011, at 1-2.
21. Although not all Article I courts are fully specialized courts, because the focus of
this article is on the Tax Court, the terms specialized court and Article I court are used
interchangeably.
22. It is worth noting that when looking at statistics relating to the federal judiciary,
those compiled by the Judicial Conference of the United States (the "Judicial Conference")
do not include the Tax Court because it is not a member of the Judicial Conference.
23. See infra Part IV.
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reappointment.24 This specified tenure makes it easier to deter-
mine the date on which potential vacancies will occur. On the
other hand, the extent to which politics rather than merit control
the appointment process may also affect the reappointment pro-
cess. Specifically, politics may affect the likelihood of reappoint-
ing a well-respected, qualified judge. Historically, most eligible
Tax Court judges willing to serve a second term were reappoint-
ed.25 In recent years, such reappointments have often been de-
layed or refused, increasing concerns about the likelihood that
well-qualified individuals would continue to seek appointment to
the bench. The nature of the appointment process and the dispar-
ity in pay between the bench and the bar exacerbates the problem
that it may be difficult to attract the best qualified candidates to
the bench, especially if an appointment to an Article I court re-
sults in little more than a fifteen-year hiatus from practice during
peak earning years.
Politicizing the selection of judges who sit for a term of years or
the conditions of reappointment at the end of a judge's term also
weakens the legitimacy of the Tax Court. Even the appearance of
increased politicization may be harmful to the institution. Thus,
the process of appointment and reappointment of Tax Court judg-
es must be examined to determine whether changes would
strengthen the vitality and perceived validity of the institution.
Institutionally, the more limited duration of the judicial ap-
pointments may be both a strength and weakness of the Article I
courts. The existence of a judiciary with limited judicial terms
may be a systemic strength for courts where the caseload fluctu-
ates and a full complement of judges is not necessary at all
times." Lifetime appointments make it difficult to decrease the
24. I.R.C. §§ 7443(b), 7447(b)(3) (2006).
25. Judges, U.S. TAX CouRT, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges.htm (last visited Dec.
12, 2011) (listing Judges John 0. Colvin, Mary Ann Cohen, Maurice B. Foley, Joseph H.
Gale, James S. Halpen, and Juan F. Vasquez as judges seeking and receiving reappoint-
ment); Matt E. Stevens, President Obama Announces Nominations, Including Maurice B.
Foley to U.S. Tax Court, PoLITIc365 (Dec. 6, 2010), http://politic365.com/2010/12/06/presi
dent-obama-announces-nominations-including-maurice-b-foley-to-u-s-tax-court.
26. As will be discussed in Part V of the article, with respect to the Tax Court, once a
judge has served a full term, the chief judge may recall the judge to serve as a senior judge
at full pay. Many judges are recalled to senior status following the expiration of their
terms, but it is impossible to know precisely how many judges seek reappointment, as the
process lacks any transparency. However, there is likely some indication of the number of
judges who request reappointment available from the number of judges that are reap-
pointed and the number of judges whose terms expire and then are recalled to senior sta-
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number of judicial officers in line with what caseloads require.
With an appointment for a term of years, at the expiration of any
term, an assessment of the court's caseload can be made to de-
termine whether all of the positions remain necessary. To assess
whether limited terms make it possible for Article I courts to re-
spond more readily to caseload fluctuations, it would be advisable
to consider all available data, including the number of cases and
their size and complexity. Systemic reviews have not been regu-
larly conducted for the purpose of determining whether "right-
sizing" of Article I courts would be appropriate.
Members of the judiciary view appointment to an Article I
court as less prestigious and, therefore, less desirable than ap-
pointment to an Article III court.27 One of the most significant
reasons contributing to this view of these courts is the unavaila-
bility of life tenure for judges serving on Article I courts. A court
with lower prestige may have a harder time attracting qualified
judicial candidates, especially given the disparity in pay between
private practice and judicial service. Even when presented with
equal salaries, potential judges may be more willing to serve on a
more prestigious Article III court.2
Although Article I courts address many important societal is-
sues including taxes, claims against the government, and bank-
ruptcy, an increased politicization of the appointment and reap-
pointment process may reduce the attractiveness of service on
these courts. As demonstrated in Part V, the available evidence
suggests that the initial appointment process in the Tax Court
largely works because the Senate Finance Committee focuses on
the merit of nominees, blocking the appointment of unqualified
candidates. Unfortunately, although the appointment process
works at the outset with respect to those already nominated,
nothing can force the President to make a nomination. As a re-
tus without reappointment, but at an age that would indicate that reappointment would
not have been a futile gesture. This, however, would not have a perfect correlation as other
factors may be reflected in a decision to seek reappointment than merely age and availa-
bility of reappointment.
27. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 254; Carstens, supra note 19, at 692-93 (discussing
concerns that commentators have expressed regarding prestige among jurists sitting on
specialized courts); Dreyfuss, supra note 19, at 3; Stempel, supra note 19, at 71-72.
28. See I.R.C. § 7443(c)(1) (2006) ("Each judge shall receive salary at the same rate
and in the same installments as judges of the district courts of the United States."). The
United States Court of Federal Claims judges also receive the same salary at the same
intervals as the United States district court judges. 28 U.S.C. § 172(b) (2006).
512 [Vol. 46:501
TAX COURT APPOINTMENTS
sult, the current process may result in unfilled vacancies for pro-
longed periods following the expiration of a judge's term. Mean-
while, the qualified judge whose term expired serves in senior
status for an extended time, often only to later receive reap-
pointment to the same position, making the vacancy wholly un-
necessary. As this phenomenon continues to increase in frequency
and duration, such gaps between terms have the potential to dis-
rupt the business of the Tax Court, impact the collegial quality of
the court, and negatively affect the quality of the opinions ren-
dered.
The political issues involved in appointments to the Tax Court
and other Article I courts are unlikely to be identical to the issues
that court watchers and constitutional scholars refer to when
they discuss the politics of judicial appointments in the context of
appointments to Article III courts. In addition to qualification to
sit on the bench, court watchers and constitutional scholars often
express concern about 'the imposition of ideological limitations
and litmus tests on nominees." In the context of Article I courts,
in addition to the same concerns about general qualification for
appointment, the more relevant concern should be whether the
nominee is qualified as a specialist judge. Some previous nomina-
tions appeared to have been made on the basis of the nominee's
actions as a party member, including contributions and recruit-
ment of donors and supporters. Appointments to specialized
courts based on party activities, rather than on their subject area
qualifications and knowledge, would be as harmful to specialized
courts as ideological limitations or litmus tests are to Article III
courts. In fact, with respect to specialized courts, the potential for
repetitive work may lower the quality of the candidates." Howev-
er, the complexity of tax law and the intricacy of many of the is-
sues considered by the Tax Court make it an ideal area for a spe-
cialized court."
29. E.g., Stolberg, supra note 7.
30. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
31. Cf. POSNER, supra note 19, at 242. Some have raised concerns about "tax excep-
tionalism." Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mea& Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judi-
cial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1619 (2006); Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty of Con-
sistency: The Failure of Common Law and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 563, 605 (2010). It seems logical that tax exceptionalism might be increased by using
specialized rather than general jurisdiction courts.
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Moreover, treating the appointment of Article I judges as pure-
ly political appointments could harm the judiciary as a whole, Ar-
ticle I courts exercise a significant measure of the country's judi-
cial power." As discussed below, in the context of the Tax Court,
such an approach will result in not only weakening an important
judicial institution but also in reducing the quality of the judges
who preside over the court's cases, irreparably harming the tax
system as a whole.
However, because the appointment process for the Tax Court,
with nominations coming from the President, proceeding through
the Senate Finance Committee, and being confirmed by the Sen-
ate, has historically fulfilled the function of rejecting the unquali-
fied candidates, no changes are recommended with respect to the
appointment process. The remainder of this part considers the
structure of the Tax Court and the history of appointments to the
Tax Court.
B. Statutory Structure of the Tax Court
In 1969, the Tax Court was established as an Article I court."
The court is comprised of judges and a chief judge, who the ap-
pointed judges elect every two years."' When fully staffed, the Tax
Court is comprised of nineteen members." Like Article III judges,
subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, the President ap-
points Tax Court judges." Specifically, the statute provides that
32. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial
Power of the United States, 118 HARv. L. REV. 648, 650-51 (2001). However, such power is
limited to the authority that is granted by Congress and lacks general equitable powers.
Comm'r v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (citing Comm'r v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.,
320 U.S. 418, 420-22 (1943)).
33. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 7441 (2006)). Establishing the United States Tax Court as an Article I
court fundamentally changed the nature of the court, which had been in existence since
1924 as an agency of the Executive Branch. See generally Harold D. Dubroff, THE UNITED
STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIs PART IV, reprinted in 41 ALB. L. REV. 1, 11-
20 (1976) [hereinafter DUBROFF, PART IV] (discussing the evolution of the United States
Tax Court from an agency of the executive branch to an Article I court).
34. I.R.C. §§ 7441, 7444(b) (2006).
35. Id. § 7443(a). The number of judges has been increased over time from sixteen to
nineteen. Act of Oct. 13, 1980, Pub. L. 96-439, § 1(a), 99 Stat. 1878 (codified at I.R.C. §
7443(a) (2006)).
36. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2; I.R.C. § 7443(b) (2006).
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"[j]udges of the Tax Court shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.""
There are three major differences between the rights and du-
ties of judges appointed to the Tax Court as Article I judges and
those appointed as Article III judges: (1) the advice and consent
path; (2) the time and consequences of retirement; and (3) the
term of service.
First, Tax Court nominees proceed through the Senate Finance
Committee, while Article III judicial nominations proceed
through the Senate Judiciary Committee." This difference re-
flects the specialized nature of the Tax Court and the compromis-
es made to elevate the court from an executive agency to full judi-
cial status." With very few exceptions, the nominees and
appointees to the Tax Court have generally been well-qualified
and respected members of the tax bar.40 During the conversion of
the Tax Court from an executive branch agency to an Article I
court and when later proposals to elevate the court or create a
Court of Appeals for Tax Appeals under Article III were made,
the value of having the greater expertise of the Senate Finance
Committee vet the nominees was viewed as a significant benefit
of Article I status.41
Second, the term of service is very different for Tax Court judg-
es than for Article III judges. Tax Court judges serve fifteen- year
terms and must retire from active service upon reaching the age
37. I.R.C. § 7443(b).
38. Compare Senate Rules, supra note 2, at R. XXV(1)(L)(S) (listing the Committee on
the Judiciary as the referral committee for all matters relating to "[flederal courts and
judges"), with id. at R. (7)(i) (making the Committee on Finance as the referral committee
for all matters involving revenue).
39. Cf. DUBROFF, PART IV, supra note 33 (mentioning the Tax Court's specialized na-
ture and discussing the political battles over its 1942 transition from "Board of Appeals" to
"Tax Court of the United States").
40. See, e.g., Michael Hoskins, New Tax Court Judge "Honored and Humbled" By Ap-
pointment, THE INDIANA LAWYER (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.theindianalawyer.con/new-
tax-court-judge-honored-and-humbled-by-appointment/PARAMS/article/25435. A different
concern may exist where judicial nominees, regardless of the court to which they are nom-
inated, are less than qualified. Although President Obama has reversed the position taken
by his immediate predecessor with respect to consulting with the American Bar Associa-
tion regarding judicial nominees, reports suggest that more of his potential nominees have
been ranked "not qualified" than were those of President George W. Bush, influencing the
slowdown in appointments. Charlie Savage, Ratings Shrink President's List for Judge-
ships, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2011, at Al.
41. See DUIBROFF, PART IV, supra note 33, at 48-50 (discussing other benefits of Arti-
cle I status).
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of seventy.42 Although not required to retire before the age of sev-
enty, Tax Court judges may elect to retire at a younger age, re-
ceiving full pay and benefits if they served for fifteen years and
reached the age of sixty-five or some other combination of age and
service that satisfies the statutory conditions referred to as the
"Rule of 80."4 In contrast, Article III judges serve "during good
behavior," with no mandatory retirement age.4 Despite the man-
datory retirement, at the discretion of the chief judge, Tax Court
judges may maintain much of their authority and continue to per-
form many of their duties by serving as senior judges.5
Third, and most importantly, Tax Court judges receive ap-
pointments for fifteen-year terms, not for life tenure. 46 However,
reappointment is possible for a judge who gives notice to the Pres-
ident of the judge's willingness to be reappointed not more than
nine and not less than six months before the expiration of their
terms. Such reappointments have historically been made as a
matter of course.
When a judge retires at the end of their term, because the
judge has reached the retirement age of seventy, or the judge re-
tires, the chief judge of the Tax Court may recall that judge to
service as a senior judge.4 Judges recalled in senior status receive
the same compensation and travel allowance as Tax Court judges
during their term of service.4 ' Although the compensation and
travel allowance paid during the regular term to Tax Court judg-
es and senior judges are identical, there are critical differences
between service as a Tax Court judge and service as a Tax Court
42. I.R.C. § 7447(b)(1) (2006).
43. Id. § 7447(b)(2); see also Frequently Asked Questions: Federal Judges, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/common/FAQS.aspx#Federaljudges (last visited Dec. 12,
2011).
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
45. I.R.C. § 7447(c).
46. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (declaring that Article III judges hold their offic-
es during good behavior), with I.R.C. § 7443(e) (stating the Tax Court judges hold terms of
fifteen years).
47. I.R.C. § 7447(b)(3).
48. Id. § 7447(c). A judge may voluntarily retire at the age of sixty-five and collect a
retired judge's salary after ten years of service on the Tax Court. Id. § 7447(b)(2). The
number of years of service required before a judge is eligible for voluntary retirement with
full pay decreases between the ages of sixty-five and sixty-nine from ten years of service to
five years of service as a presidentially appointed Tax Court judge. Id.
49. Id. § 7447(c).
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senior judge.' Perhaps the most important difference is the au-
thority to participate in court-reviewed decisions and have an
opinion take effect pursuant to Internal Revenue Code § 7460(b).
That statute states:
The report of the division shall become the report of the Tax Court
within 30 days after such report by the division, unless within such
period the chief judge has directed that such report shall be reviewed
by the Tax Court.... The report of a division shall not be a part of
the record in any case in which the chief judge directs that such re-
port shall be reviewed by the Tax Court.5'
Thus, the Tax Court permits review only by the presidentially
appointed judges, except in instances where a senior judge was
the trier of fact. As a result, upon the expiration of a judge's term,
the Tax Court judge does not have the same rights and privileges
as prior to expiration of his or her judicial term.
III. THE HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS AND REAPPOINTMENTS
TO THE TAX COURT
The appointment and reappointment of Tax Court judges has
largely ensured that only well-qualified candidates have served
as adjudicators since the Tax Court and its predecessor, the
Board of Tax Appeals, became independent of the Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue.5' In 1924, the Board of Tax Appeals was created
as an independent executive branch agency to provide an inde-
pendent body to which taxpayers could appeal asserted tax liabil-
ities prior to paying the tax liability." The other available fora in
which a taxpayer can challenge a tax liability-the United States
district courts and the United States Court of Federal Claims-
require that the taxpayer first pay the tax and then file a claim
for refund."
50. See id. §§ 7443(a), 7444(c).
51. Id. § 7460(b).
52. See generally DUBROFF, PART IV, supra note 33, at 11-20 (discussing the transi-
tion from the "Board of Appeals" to "Tax Court of the United States").
53. See generally BORIS L. BITTKER & LAWRENCE NOKEN, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS 115-8 (2d ed., 1992) (providing background information on the
organization and jurisdiction of the Tax Court); HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES
TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, PART II: CREATION OF THE BOARD OF TAX
APPEALS--THE REVENUE ACT OF 1924, reprinted in 40 ALB. L. REV. 53 (1975) [hereinafter
DUBROFF, PART II] (discussing the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals).
54. I.R.C. § 7422(a) (2006) (authorizing suits for refunds); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)
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Driving the creation of this forum, where tax payers could chal-
lenge their tax liability prior to paying it, were concerns that re-
quiring prepayment of tax liabilities prior to allowing a taxpayer
to challenge an asserted tax deficiency might cause undue hard-
ship for those taxpayers who were unable to pay the tax." The
new income tax might overwhelm the system and require signifi-
cant judicial involvement because of the complexity of the income
tax code." These concerns led to the creation of the Board of Tax
Appeals," an administrative agency that was part of the Treasury
Department but was independent of the Bureau of Internal Rev-
enue.5
A matter of serious discussion and concern surrounded who
would be permitted to serve as an adjudicator on the new body.
Then, as today, the concerns were both practical and political. As
part of the discussion of who should be members of the Board of
Tax Appeals, consideration was given to whether the members
needed to be lawyers, accountants, or even lay people." It was ul-
timately decided that members of the Board should be lawyers."
Professor Harold Dubroff, in his history of the Tax Court, notes
"it should not be surprising that Presidents have tended to select
appointees for the Board and the Tax Court from the ranks of
(2006) (providing the United States Court of Federal Claims with refund jurisdiction in
tax cases). The United States Court of Federal Claims was originally named the Court of
Claims. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
55. See DUBROFF, PART II, supra note 53, at 27-28.
56. Id.
57. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 253, 336. The
Board of Tax Appeals was the early predecessor to today's United States Tax Court. Its
evolution has been significant, from 1924, as an agency that was part of the Treasury De-
partment but independent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, to 1942 when its name was
changed to the Tax Court of the United States, although it remained an executive branch
agency. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798, 957.
Again, in 1969, the agency was changed, making it an Article I, legislative court, which
will be discussed in some greater depth later in this article, and again renamed, this time
as the United States Tax Court. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83
Stat. 487, 730 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 7441 (2006)). For a more complete discus-
sion of the history of the Tax Court's evolution see DUBROFF, PART II, supra note 53;
DUBROFF, PART IV, supra note 33.
58. The Bureau of Internal Revenue was the predecessor to our modern day Internal
Revenue Service. See T.D. 6038, 1953-2C.B. 443 ("[A] reference to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue shall be deemed to refer to the Internal Revenue Service.").
59. See DUBROFF, PART II, supra note 53, at 88, 92-93. Among the considerations was
the fact that everyone should understand the relatively new tax obligations and that many
tax professionals would not be lawyers. See id. at 92-93.
60. See id. at 108.
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their own parties."6 After deciding the nature of the members'
professional background, politics played a role in the selection
process.62 Because of the judicial nature of the appointments and
the fact that the President makes the appointments, the possibil-
ity that politics always played a role in the appointment process
is neither new nor surprising. Even though the political affiliation
of the first appointees to the newly created Board of Tax Appeals
was noted, the appointees' professional qualifications were the
paramount factor in obtaining their appointments.63 The party af-
filiation appeared parenthetically alongside the names in the list
of recommended membership that Treasury Secretary Mellon
prepared and presented to President Calvin Coolidge in 1924 for
the first Board of Tax Appeals. However, others argue that poli-
tics have played a very limited role in Tax Court appointments, at
least to the extent that the politics at play are party politics."
One thing that proponents of the creation of a specialized tax
tribunal knew early on was that the Tax Court had little hope of
becoming an Article III court with attendant powers, privileges,
and life-tenured judges.6 6 This expectation was affirmed when the
Board of Tax Appeals was first created, as well as when the Tax
Court was established in 1969, accompanied by a near uniform
rejection of the idea that the court should be accorded Article III
status.6 '
Professor Dubroff notes that Congress adopted a novel ap-
proach to the tenure of Tax Court judges in 1969 when it convert-
ed the Board from an executive agency at a time when proposals
to grant the new court Article III status faced very strong opposi-
tion from groups, including the Judicial Conference.6 8 Professor
Dubroff also notes that Representative Wilbur Mills and Senator
Russell Long, chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee
and the Senate Finance Committee respectively, were very con-
cerned about terms that allowed judges to serve "in good behav-
61. Id.
62. See id. at 88.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Sheryl Stratton, Tax Court Judges May Not Be Back, Even by Popular Demand,
102 TAX NOTES 176, 180 (2004).
66. See, e.g., DUBROFF, PART IV, supra note 33, at 7-10, 38-48, 50-51.
67. Id. at 7-10, 50-51.
68. Id. at 50.
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ior."6 9 Discussing the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, Professor Dubroff concludes that "[t]his was a novel ap-
proach to the problem of judicial tenure, and permitted the forced
retirement of judges without formal removal proceedings, while
guaranteeing financial independence to those so retired.""
Although politics are always a consideration in any appoint-
ment process, their effect on judicial appointments has not fre-
quently been to the exclusion of the consideration of a potential
judge's qualification and merit, especially in the Tax Court. Not
surprisingly, most Presidents favored nominees from their own
party, but both Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and Jimmy
Carter appointed Tax Court judges across party lines.n In 1960,
President Eisenhower, a Republican, appointed Irene C. Scott, a
Democrat from Alabama, to replace Marion J. Harron (a Republi-
can appointed by President Truman in 1948) who failed to make a
timely request for reappointment.7 2 In 1979, President Carter, a
Democrat, appointed Arthur L. Nims III, a New Jersey Republi-
can, to serve on the Tax Court." Notwithstanding these two ex-
ceptions, the initial appointments of Tax Court judges have gen-
erally come from within the President's party.7 4
In most instances, however, the President reappointed those
judges who indicated a willingness to continue serving on the Tax
Court regardless of the judge's party affiliation. In fact, until re-
cently there were not any reported instances of willing judges be-
ing refused reappointment since the Eisenhower administration.
A secondary effect of the Tax Court originating as an executive
agency is its continued struggle for legitimacy in the eyes of some
taxpayers and litigants. Politicizing the selection of judges or the
69. Id. at 47-48; Long, Russell Billiu, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S.
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=LOO428 (last visited
Dec. 12. 2011); Mills, Wilbur Daigh, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,
http:/Ibioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M000778 (last visited Dec. 12,
2011).
70. DUBROFF, PART IV, supra note 33, at 49.




75. Id.; see infra Part IV.
76. Stratton, supra note 65, at 180.
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conditions under which a judge may be reappointed at the end of
their term weakens the legitimacy of the Tax Court.
IV. RECENT TAX COURT APPOINTMENTS AND REAPPOINTMENTS
The structure of the Tax Court vis-a-vis appointments and re-
appointments worked relatively well until the administrations of
Presidents William J. Clinton and George W. Bush." Like other
judicial appointments, in both Article III and Article I courts, Tax
Court appointments during these presidential administrations
became increasingly politicized, causing confirmation to take in-
creasingly longer." Prior to these administrations, Presidents
routinely reappointed Tax Court judges whose terms were expir-
ing, regardless of who had originally appointed the judge." Both
the Clinton and Bush administrations, likely for different rea-
sons, changed this traditional approach and in so doing weakened
the process by allowing terms to expire, waiting to announce re-
appointments or nominations, and introducing more politics into
the process.
Beginning in the Clinton administration, occurring throughout
George W. Bush's administration, and extending into the first two
years of the Obama administration, a significant number of Tax
Court judges' terms have expired.o These Presidents have re-
peatedly delayed announcing the reappointment or replacement
of judges whose terms have expired." The lapse of time between
terms has caused a variety of problems for the administration of
the Tax Court, including reducing the Tax Court's ability to serve
taxpayers and potentially harming its legitimacy."
77. Id. at 176. Prior to the slowdowns that occurred during the Clinton and Bush ad-
ministrations, reappointment occurred as a matter of course dating back to the Eisenhow-
er administration. See id.
78. See id. at 176, 179--80 (exploring lapses in Tax Court reappointments and confir-
mations during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations).
79. Id. at 179.
80. See id. at 179-80; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Nomi-
nations Sent to Senate (Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/01/05 (noting Judge Foley was nominated for reappointment by President
Obama on December 6, 2010); Judge Maurice B. Foley, U.S. TAX COURT, http://www.ustax
court.gov/judges/foley/htm (last updated May 6, 2010) (noting Judge Foley's term ended
April 8, 2010).
81. See Stratton, supra note 65, at 176, 179-80.
82. Id. at 179.
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During the first Clinton administration, Tax Court reappoint-
ments began to slow. For instance, the terms of Judges Herbert
Chabot," Mary Ann Cohen,8 4 Stephen Swift," and Joel Gerber ex-
pired." When Judge Mary Ann Cohen's term expired in 1997, she
was serving a term as chief judge." This lapse led to a structural
crisis in the court because the statute did not address an expira-
tion of the sitting chief judge's term. Ultimately, the appointment
of an interim chief judge solved this problem." However, if the
President had taken timely reappointment action, a stopgap
measure would not have been necessary.
Although President Clinton ultimately reappointed all four
judges, the nomination delays were significant, ranging from six
weeks to two years. 8 The lapse in these judges' terms of service
had meaningful consequences because they interfered with the
operation of the Tax Court. Significantly, the failure to timely re-
appoint judges or to nominate replacements was unprecedented. 0
83. See Judge Herbert L. Chabot, U.S. TAX COURT available at http://www.ustaxcourt.
gov/judges/chabot.htm (last updated Jan. 7, 2009). Judge Chabot's term expired on April 3,
1993. Id. On October 20, 1993, he received appointment to a term ending October 29,
2008. Id. Judge Chabot ultimately retired and accepted senior status on July 1, 2001. Id.
84. See Judge Mary Ann Cohen, U.S. TAX COURT, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges/
cohen.htm (last updated Apr. 7, 2009). President Reagan appointed Judge Cohen on Sep-
tember 24, 1982 to a term ending on September 23, 1997. Id. She was reappointed and
sworn in on November 7, 1997. Id. Judge Cohen served as chief judge from June 1, 1996
through September 23, 1997, and, again, from November 7, 1997 to May 31, 2000. Id. The
interruption in her term as chief judge is attributable to the time during which her term
expired making her ineligible to serve as the chief judge because she was not a presiden-
tially appointed judge but served as a recalled judge on senior status. See Stratton, supra
note 65, at 179.
85. See Judge Stephen J. Swift, U.S. TAX COURT, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges/
swift.htm (last updated Sept. 7, 2010). President Reagan initially appointed Judge Ste-
phen J. Swift in 1983 to a term that expired on August 15, 1998. Id. Chief Judge Mary
Ann Cohen recalled Judge Swift to serve as a senior judge until his reappointment on De-
cember 1, 2000 for a term ending on November 30, 2015. Id. He retired on September 7,
2008. Id.
86. See Judge Joel Gerber, U.S. TAX COURT, http://www.uscourt.gov/judges/gerber/
htm (last updated Jan. 7, 2009). Judge Joel Gerber received his appointment to the Tax
Court on June 18, 1984, for a fifteen-year term that expired on June 17, 1999. Id. His re-
appointed occurred on December 15, 2000 to a fifteen-year term that will expire on De-
cember 14, 2015. Id. Judge Gerber served as a senior judge between June 17, 1999 and
December 15, 2000. Id. He assumed senior status on June 1, 2006 following service from
June 1, 2004 through May 31, 2006 as the chief judge of the Tax Court. Id.
87. See Stratton, supra note 65, at 179.
88. Id.




Since the Eisenhower administration Tax Court judges who re-
quested timely reappointment received timely nominations .9
To provide context for the discussion of the delays in reap-
pointments, open positions, and their effects on the Tax Court,
the following table sets forth information on all of the Tax Court
judges whose terms expired between the beginning of the Clinton
administration in January 1993 and the end of the second year of
the Obama administration in 2010. This table reflects only those
judges who still serve on the Tax Court in active or senior status
and does not reflect retired judges, who no longer provide service
to the court. As the
simple data shows a
pointment process.
Chart 1
discussion will demonstrate, this relatively
great deal about the appointment and reap-
Date of Appoint- Date Re- Reappoint- Time on Senior
Judge Initial ing Presi- appointed ing Presi- Status Between
ment or Retired dent Appointments
Reappt
Howard A. 6/2/1970 Nixon None
Dawson, Jr. 8/21/1962 Kennedy Retired
6/2/1985
Reappt
Herbert L. 4/3/1978 Carter 10/20/1993 Clinton 6 months - 4/2/1993
Chabot Retired to 10/19/1993
6/30/2001
Arthur L. 6/29/1979 Carter Retired Retired at end
Nims, III 6/1/1992 of first term
Mary nn Rappt1.5 months -
MCaryhAnn 9/24/1982 Reagan 1/7a 7 Clinton 9/23/1997 through11/7/1997
Reappt135mnh
Stephe J. 8/16/1983 Reagan 1Rtr0 Clinton 8/15/1998 through
9/7/2008 12/1/2000
Juia 3/30/1984 Reagan 3/29/1999 Retird at endJacobs of first term
Reappt 18 months - from
Joel Gerber 6/18/1984 Reagan 12/15/2000 Clinton 6/17/1999 throughRetired 11420
6/1/2006 12/14/2000
Reappt
Thomas B. 10/13/1986 Reagan 10/10/2001 Clinton NoneWells Retired
1/1/2011
91. Id. The last untimely nomination for reappointment was Judge Clarence V. Opper
whose term lapsed for six months during President Truman's administration in 1950. Id.
at 179.
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Retired Retired at end
Robert P. Ruwe 11/20/1987 Reaga 11/19/2002 of first term
Laurence J. 11/23/1987 Reagan Retired Retired at end
Whalen 11/23/2007 of first term
11.5 months -
John 0. Colvin 9/1/1988 Reagan 8/1 4 GeBrgeh 8/30/2003 through
0 B8/12/2004
James S. 7/3/1990 George Reappt George W. 4 months - 7/2/2005
Halpern H.W. Bush 11/2/2005 Bush through 11/2/2005
Retired before
Renato Beghe 3/26/1991 H.W. Bush 2/28/2003 completion of
first term*
Carolyn 10/1/1992 George Retired Retired at end
Chiechi H.W. Bush 9/30/2007 of first term
David Laro 112/1992 George Retired Retired at endH.W. Bush 11/1/2007 of first term
19.6 months -Maurice 4/9/1995 Clinton 11/5/211 Obama 4/8/2010 through
l1 11/25/2011
Reappt 17.5 months -Juan F. 5/1/1995 Clinton Reappt Obama 130/2010 through
Vasquez 11/18/2011 10/18/2011
8.5 months -
Joseph H. Gale 2/6/1996 Clinton 10e8/p11 Obama 2/5/2011 through
10/18/2011
Retired before
Ha r e 4/22/2003 Georgeh 53 td9 completion ofHaines Bush 5/30/2009 first term* _________
*Judge retired before the completion of first term, then served as senior judges on
recall at the request of the Chief Judge of the Tax Court.
[Vol. 46:501524
TAX COURT APPOINTMENTS
A few easily observed phenomena are apparent from the infor-
mation in this chart. First, not all of the Tax Court judges who
reach the expiration of their fifteen-year term either seek or are
chosen for nomination to a second fifteen-year term. This sample
involves judges whose terms expired over a period of seventeen
years. In that time, nineteen judges' terms expired and eight of
those judges did not seek or were not chosen for nomination for a
second term. Notably, these eight constitute almost half of those
who might otherwise have been eligible.
All of the remaining eleven judges expressed willingness to
serve a second term, and the sitting President, who was frequent-
ly not from the same party as the President who originally ap-
pointed the judge, nominated all of these judges. Of these eleven,
nine of those judges experienced delays ranging from as short as
one and a half months to as long as eighteen months. Thus, only
two judges, Judges Thomas B. Wells and Howard A. Dawson, Jr.,
were immediately nominated, vetted, and confirmed to the posi-
tion they already held without some delay.
The remainder of the reappointed judges lost the status of Tax
Court judge in the interim between the expiration of their term
and the confirmation of their reappointment, requiring them to
serve as senior judges on recall at the request of the chief judge
until the completion of the nomination and confirmation process.
This delay reduces the rights of the judges, changes the court's
procedures and the dynamics in the court's statutory conference
process, and may introduce other questions regarding how the
court should operate since its authority to exist is entirely statu-
tory.
These delays led to a slowing of the Tax Court's ability to func-
tion, which the practicing tax bar met with surprise. In May
2000, at a meeting of the American Bar Association (the "ABA")
Taxation Section, Chairman Paul Sax," said "[i]t's disruptive of
the process of the court to have these three judges in semiperma-
nent limbo."" The process itself lacks transparency, frequently
making it unclear whether the judges themselves have requested
92. Paul J. Sax, SACRAMENTO STATE, http://www.csus.edulssis/inductees/academy
sax.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
93. Tom Herman, Tax Report: The IRS and Justice Department Turn Up the Heat on
Illegal Trusts, WALL. ST. J. (May 17, 2000), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB9585238143
11486304.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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reappointment. However, during recent delays, even some of the
judges discussed the lack of movement. Notably, at an ABA Taxa-
tion Section meeting occurring before the expiration of her own
term, Chief Judge Mary Ann Cohen stated that "[w]e've heard
some encouraging words but no action."" Judge Cohen not only
experienced the problem administratively as chief judge, requir-
ing her to recall Judges Swift, Jacob, and Gerber to serve as sen-
ior judges," but she later faced a similar wait for her own reap-
pointment.
The two prior presidential administrations and their staffs
agreed that politics slowed the appointments process. The Clinton
administration cited politics as a reason for the delay in action on
the reappointments." White House Deputy Press Secretary Jim
Kennedy responded to concerns at the May 2000 session meeting
by stating that he expected action soon on the Tax Court posi-
tions." However, he went on to add that "the real delay in judicial
nominations comes from Republicans in the Senate who continue
to hold up dozens of highly qualified nominations.""
An important distinction between nominees to serve on Article
III courts and nominees to serve on the Tax Court is that the
former are vetted through the Senate Judiciary Committee,'o
whereas the latter are vetted through the Senate Finance Com-
mittee.' The most publicly discussed judicial nominees are those
going through the Senate Judiciary Committee. Fortunately, fili-
busters are not threatened over judicial nominees coming from
the Senate Finance Committee in the manner that they are over
nominees coming out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.o2
Additional changes to the appointment process occurred during
the Clinton administration. Midway through his second term,
President Clinton decided not to accept recommendations from
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. See Stratton, supra note 65, at 179.
97. Herman, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Senate Rules, supra note 2, at R. XXXV(1)(L)(5).
101. Id. at R. XXV(1)(i).
102. Carl Hulse, G.O.P. Blocks Judicial Nominee in a Sign of Battles to Come, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2011, at A16.
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the ABA on potential judicial nominees.' This decision eliminat-
ed a potentially powerful ally to the President because these rec-
ommendations had ensured that candidates possessed the re-
quired qualifications while also reducing the likelihood of
publicizing multiple names to obtain sufficient information for
adequate vetting.104
Similar delays occurred during President George W. Bush's
administration. He was also slow to name new nominees to the
Tax Court bench or to seek reappointment of judges whose terms
were expiring. In addition, during both of his presidential terms,
the process used to nominate Tax Court judges became increas-
ingly politicized. President Bush initially refused to nominate sit-
ting judges for reappointment, preferring to use the vacancies as
political appointments.'05 Despite a number of successful nomina-
tions to the Tax Court, President Bush made two famously un-
successful appointments. He withdrew the nominations of Fran-
cis Cramer and Glen Bower because the Senate Finance
Committee would not approve them due to their lack of experi-
ence and failure to meet other minimum qualifications."' Howev-
er, because of the political pressure to find a role for these nomi-
nees, Cramer and Bower were ultimately nominated for and
approved as immigration judges, despite their lack of experience
or expertise in immigration law.'o
Observers noted that President Bush disregarded the weight of
history by refusing to reappoint sitting Tax Court judges who
possessed valuable experience in favor of those who had served
103. Stratton, supra note 65, at 178. The refusal to accept input from the ABA was
even more pronounced during President Bush's administration. In contrast, President
Obama has actively sought the ABA's rating of judicial nominees, although the ratings
have reportedly not been entirely favorable. Savage, supra note 40.
104. Stratton, supra note 65, at 178.
105. See id. at 176, 178. It may be worth noting that many of the terms that expired
early in his presidency were those of judges who were appointed by his father, President
George H.W. Bush, or the preceding Republican president who also remains widely re-
spected in Republican circles, President Ronald Reagan. Id. at 176.
106. Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on GOP
Ties, Law Forbids Practice; Courts Being Reshaped, WASH. POST, June 11, 2007, at Al.
107. Id. Not only were these two failed Tax Court appointees named to the Immigra-
tion Court, but "[alt least one-third of the immigration judges appointed by the Justice
Department since 2004 have had Republican connections or have been administration in-
siders, and have lacked experience in immigration law, Justice Department, immigration
court and other records show." Id. Appointments to the Immigration Court were easier to
accomplish because the Department Head, the Attorney General, rather than the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate, made the appointment. See id.
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his party during his campaign."as Nominees who did not possess
adequate character and fitness failed to survive the vetting pro-
cess in the Republican-controlled Senate Finance Committee.
Historically these potential nominees might have been stopped by
the vetting process before they became public. However, the de-
sire to avoid outside influence resulted in the withdrawal of both
nominations.
The first of these unsuccessful nominees, Francis L. Cramer,
lacked experience as a tax practitioner. The Wall Street Journal
reported:
An American Bar Association panel questions Francis L. Cramer's
qualifications for the U.S. Tax Court, which decides IRS disputes
with taxpayers. Cramer is close to New Hampshire GOP Sen. Gregg
and works in the law firm founded by Gregg's father, a former gov-
ernor. Its Web site says his focus is commercial and personal-injury
litigation.
Senate Finance Committee Democrats sought ABA review; the
group's pan of a tax judge is the first tax lawyers recall. Bush offi-
cials want to reduce the ABA's longtime role vetting judicial nomi-
nees, claiming bias against conservatives. o0
The second nominee, Glen L. Bower, who had previously served
on the Railroad Retirement Board and for the Illinois Department
of Revenue, received a nomination in October 2003.11o In March
2004, the White House withdrew his nomination after it became
clear that his nomination would not clear the Senate Finance
Committee after Senator Baucus raised significant concerns
about Bower's personal income tax returns."
It became clear that the administration was determined to find
judicial positions for these nominees. Both Cramer and Bower
subsequently received successful nominations to the immigration
court.112 The functioning of the Senate, particularly the Senate
108. Heather Bennett, White House Withdraws Bower Nomination for Tax Court
Judge, 102 TAX NOTES 1602, 1602 (2004); Stratton, supra note 65, at 177; Jackie Calmes,
A Special Weekly Report from the Wall Street Journal's Capital Bureau, WALL ST. J., May
24, 2002, at A4.
109. Calmes, supra note 108.
110. Bennett, supra note 108.
111. Stratton, supra note 65, at 178. It was also noted that over half of the appoint-
ments to the immigration court during the administration of President George W. Bush
were unqualified in immigration matters and that over one-third of the appointees had a
Republican connection or were administration insiders. Eggen & Goldstein, supra note
106.
112. Eggen & Goldstein, supra note 106. Neither nominee had a significant immigra-
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Finance Committee, as a gatekeeper to prevent the successful ap-
pointment of less than fully qualified professionals to Tax Court
judgeships indicates that the appointment process worked in the-
se two instances.
By 2003, the Bush administration changed the process even
further. That year the Bush administration allowed Judge John
0. Colvin's term to expire."' This term expiration was the final
straw that called both the tax bar and Congress to action regard-
ing presidential inaction relating to the expiration of Tax Court
terms. Reportedly, the Treasury General Counsel's committee,
which then consisted of Treasury General Counsel David D.
Aufhauser, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Pamela
Olson, Eileen J. O'Connor, the assistant attorney general for the
Justice Department's tax division, IRS Chief Counsel B. John
Williams Jr., and Associate White House Counsel D. Kyle
Sampson, reviewed Judge Colvin's record following his timely re-
quest for reappointment and unanimously recommended his re-
appointment. " The memo recommending Judge Colvin's reap-
pointment allegedly stated that if he was not a sitting judge, he
would be the group's first choice for appointment to the Tax
Court."' However, during the summer, the White House appar-
ently notified certain members of the Treasury General Counsel's
Committee that the White House would not reappoint the judges
currently sitting on the Tax Court."6
Apparently unaware of the Bush administration's change of
policies, the ABA and Senate reacted to the failure to put forward
Judge Colvin's nomination for reappointment."' Within two days
in October 2003, President Bush received two separate letters,
one from the ABA Section on Taxation, signed by Richard A.
Shaw, the section's president, and a second from the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate Finance Committee, Senators
Charles E. Grassley and Max Baucus, and the Chairman of the
tion law background. See id.
113. Stratton, supra note 65, at 179.
114. Id. IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams, Jr., served as a Tax Court Judge from
December 2, 1985, until February 28, 1990. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, B.
John Williams, Jr., Sworn in as Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 7,
2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-release/Pages/po 978.aspx.
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Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Orrin Hatch. Both letters
urged President Bush to reappoint Judge Colvin to the Tax
Court."' Following the calls for Judge Colvin's reappointment,
President Bush's staff indicated the President would consider
nominating sitting Tax Court judges for reappointment, along
with other potential nominees, but would not automatically reap-
point Tax Court judges as a matter of course."' Simply put, Pres-
ident Bush intended to only consider reappointments on a case-
by-case basis.'
The Bush administration's approach to filling positions on the
Tax Court differed from that used by prior presidential admin-
istrations. In prior administrations, the names of future nominees
to the Tax Court often originated in the White House rather than
in recommendations from the Treasury.'"' Despite the Bush ad-
ministration's attempts to further reduce the influence the ABA
and its sections exerted in vetting judicial candidates, the Senate
Finance Committee still received the vetting information provid-
ed by the ABA Taxation Section.'
However, since the nomination had already been made, such
vetting could not be used to avoid potentially embarrassing nom-
inations. In previous administrations, the White House received
vetting and qualification ratings prior to the announcing nomina-
tion, thus keeping such information confidential."' After an-
nouncing the nominee's name, qualification ratings could not re-
main confidential.'24 Allowing the ABA qualification rating to
become public can potentially result in embarrassment to the
President and the nominees. For instance, if the White House had
asked the ABA for a rating on Francis L. Cramer, a public state-
ment from Senator Baucus about his lack of qualifications might
not have been needed. Knowing his rating prior to the nomination
might have reduced the time and resources spent on his ultimate-
ly withdrawn nomination and eliminated the embarrassment to
him and the White House.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 180.
121. Id. at 177-78.





President Obama has returned to the practice of seeking quali-
fication ratings from the ABA.' Although the President's staff
has noted that the administration does not agree with all of the
ratings, this process has resulted in potential judicial nominees
not coming forward."
Generally, the appointment and reappointment of Tax Court
judges has resulted in a very qualified and specialized Tax Court
bench. However, the recent politicization of the process and the
nomination of truly political appointees, rather than qualified
and respected members of the tax bar, raise questions about the
legitimacy of the court's decisions. Furthermore, the assistance of
the ABA and its sections prior to naming nominees could mean
avoiding needless embarrassment to presidential administrations
and nominees. It could also reduce the time required to complete
the appointment process.
The reappointment process and politicization of appointments
raises new questions and that part of the process now merits re-
consideration. The apparent fairness of the process by which
judges are appointed or reappointed will influence the perceived
legitimacy of the Tax Court.'27 When considering the possibility of
changing the appointment and reappointment process for Tax
Court judges, reviewing past practices is important.
At its inception, significant distrust surrounded a reviewing
body consisting entirely of lawyers."' Resolving the problem with
Tax Court appointments and reappointments is easier than re-
solving the inherent problems of politics and the conflict between
government tax collections and taxpayers' desires to minimize
their tax bills. In this context, developing an actual procedural
mechanism to ensure sound reappointments will eliminate many
of the concerns associated with the symptom of politics in the op-
eration of the Tax Court. Because taxes are a part of our everyday
lives and essential to the government's operation, the concern is
that citizens should have adequate recourse to redress govern-
125. Savage, supra note 40.
126. Id.
127. See generally Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (affirming the constitution-
ality of a decision rendered by a Tax Court judge following a fact-finding process conducted
by a special trial judge).
128. DUBROFF, PART II, supra note 53, at 92-93 (noting that until its dissolution in
1924, the several members on the Committee on Appeals and Review, an internal review
mechanism within the Bureau of Internal Revenue, were not lawyers).
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mental assertions of taxes owed with which the citizen disagrees.
This belief is so deeply ingrained in our social fabric that the le-
gitimacy of that process must be fiercely protected.
Problems with timely reappointment may create disabilities
that impact the operation of the court and the effectiveness of the
judges. Because each judge whose term lapsed is no longer a
"judge," he or she is no longer eligible to participate in the confer-
ence for review of Tax Court opinions.' Therefore, the several oc-
casions when there have been multiple vacancies simultaneously
on the Tax Court created a deeply problematic situation of fewer
judges eligible to participate in court review of important issues.
This situation results in fewer voices and potentially less robust
discussion of the legal issues at stake in any given case to deter-
mine the proper application of the law. With fewer views on an
issue of law, the results may not be as well considered because
fewer perspectives will be represented. Also, fewer opinions pre-
sent in a court reviewed Tax Court Opinion may result in less
transparency regarding how the court will handle future cases.
This lack of transparency creates a potential detriment to all tax-
payers.
Another concern involves the issue of staffing the Tax Court. A
President may choose not to reappoint a judge if the caseload of
the Tax Court has decreased, making fewer judges necessary.
Therefore, a benefit of an Article I court in which judges serve for
a term of years, rather than during "good behavior," is more flexi-
bility to change judicial staffing to reflect the caseload. However,
such changes in judicial staffing should be made thoughtfully and
after careful study, not impulsively and without consideration of
caseload and complexity. Additional considerations affecting the
caseload involve the differences between Tax Court judges and
senior judges. Tax Court judges are permitted to have more law
clerks and administrative staff than senior judges.'3 0 Additionally,
statutorily, senior judges are not required to work the same num-
ber of days as judges."' Thus, changing the number of judges sig-
nificantly impacts the work of the Tax Court.
129. See I.R.C. §§ 7443(a), 7447(a)(2), (c) (2006). Further complicating the issues is the
judge's ineligibility to serve as chief judge. Id. §§ 7444(b), 7447(a)(2), (c).
130. Stratton, supra note 65, at 176.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 371(A)-(C) (2006).
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According to the figures available for the IRS Office of Chief
Counsel, approximately ninety percent of all civil tax litigation
occurs in the Tax Court.' As a result, fewer active judges with a
full staff will likely result in slower, less well-developed decisions.
Because the Tax Court is, first and foremost, a prepayment fo-
rum, slower opinions mean taxpayers continue to accrue interest
and penalties on the asserted tax liabilities until the liabilities
are paid. In cases where the court rules in favor of the IRS, the
longer it takes to render a final decision, the greater the debt the
taxpayer owes.
V. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE THE REAPPOINTMENT PROCESS
The major potential problem of changes to the appointment
and reappointment process that politicize the selection of Tax
Court judges is that the politicization risks diminishing confi-
dence in an integral part of the tax system. The Tax Court has
long been charged with being biased for or against taxpayers.133
Although these charges are generally anecdotal rather than em-
pirically based, such fears increase if politics, rather than qualifi-
cations and merit, provide the basis for appointments to this
court. Moreover, perception is often reality in that if taxpayers
lose confidence in the system, they will be less likely to comply.
Due to a number of factors, including that the taxpayer need
not prepay the tax prior to filing a petition in the Tax Court, the
majority of tax cases are filed in the Tax Court. Just because it is
a prepayment forum, however, does not decrease the importance
of obtaining a legitimate and trustworthy judgment.
In addition, new judges will not be as efficient as more experi-
enced judges. Those who have served for a period of time will be
more effective in handling complex cases.
132. Table 27: Chief Counsel Workload: Tax Litigation Cases, by Case Type, Fiscal Year
2008, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstatstarticle/O,,id=
207733,00.html (last updated Mar. 14, 2011) (showing just over 35,000 active tax litigation
in the fiscal year 2008, with all but 235 pending in the Tax Court). Similar reports are
available for fiscal years 2001 through 2007. See S01 Tax Status-Chief Counsel Work-
load: Tax Litigation Cases, by Type of Case, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.
gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/o,,id=207733,00html (last updated Mar. 14, 2011) (listing
the caseloads from 1998 to 2010). The caseload increased in 2008. See id.
133. Maule, supra note 17, at 353 (exploring allegations of Tax Court bias and conclud-
ing that such allegations are unfounded).
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Structural problems may also result from regularly allowing
judges' terms to lapse. An example is the controversy that result-
ed when the then-current chief judge's term expired during the
Clinton administration. President Clinton's failure to timely re-
appoint Chief Judge Mary Ann Cohen represented a major shift
in policy relating to the Tax Court. Not reappointing productive
Tax Court judges who have indicated a desire to continue serving,
as happened during the Bush administration, was a further shift
from the traditional appointment and reappointment process for
Tax Court judges. Because more than seventeen months elapsed
between the expiration of the terms of Judges Foley and Vasquez
and their nominations for reappointment, and four months be-
tween the expiration of Judge Gale's term and his nomination for
reappointment,"' lags between term expiration and nomination
have become the norm in the Obama administration. Arriving on
July 11, 2011, and receiving confirmation on September 26, 2011,
Judge Gale's nomination was the quickest to make it through the
Senate.' After their nominations in January 2011, Judges Foley
and Vasquez also were confirmed on September 26, 2011.36 Four
judicial slots remain unfilled. As a result, the problems associated
with vacancies on the Tax Court and Tax Court judges' terms ex-
piring without reappointment remain unaddressed.
The Tax Court's approach to applying its own precedent,17 the
statutes relating to court conferences, and the manner in which
the Tax Court decides its cases make reappointment a real and
important issue. While there have been several unsuccessful at-
tempts to make the Tax Court an Article III court,' it is unlikely
that future efforts will be any more successful, making significant
disruptions of its operations a potentially continuous problem. As
a consequence, a compromise somewhere between the life tenure
of Article III judges and the current state of affairs is needed.
134. Presidential Nominations 112th Congress (2011-2012), THOMAS, http://thomas/loc.
gov/home/nomis.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2011) (listing Judge Maurice B. Foley as presi-
dential nominee PN 58-112; Judge Juan F. Vasquez as presidential nominee PN 108-112;
and Judge Joseph H. Gale as presidential nominee PN 754-112).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
138. DUBROFF, PART II, supra note 53, at 172-73; Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court,
Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A Study in
Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 991 (1991).
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This article presents three possibilities, but rules out the first
two as unworkable and possibly unconstitutional, before adopting
the third. The first possible approach to improving the reap-
pointment process creates a presumption of reappointment for
judges who have satisfied certain criteria. The second possible
approach lengthens the term of a Tax Court judge to twenty
years. The third approach lies somewhere in between the two
previous options and allows a judge whose term has expired and
is serving as a senior judge to retain the rights and privileges of
an active judge until reappointment, nomination of a replace-
ment, or a declaration that the position will remain unfilled.
The first possible solution would be to require that judges up
for reappointment receive favorable ratings from the ABA Section
on Taxation Judicial Appointments Committee before permitting
reappointment. In addition, because of the desire to ensure conti-
nuity on the bench and to retain appointments within the Presi-
dents' party, as well as to conserve resources during the vetting
process, it may also be desirable to limit reappointments to judges
young enough to complete a specific portion of the second term,
such as two-thirds, before reaching the mandatory retirement age
of seventy. Finally, before applying any presumptions of reap-
pointment, it is likely desirable to continue to have the judge ex-
press a timely interest in reappointment.
Any presumption of reappointment would significantly limit
the role of politics in the reappointment process. In addition, be-
cause of the time and resources required to vet candidates, even
for reappointments, it might be reasonable to ask a candidate
about his or her intentions to complete the entire term."9 By bal-
ancing concerns that judges not be automatically reappointed,
this option leaves the sitting President with the intended discre-
tion to appoint a nominee of his or her own choosing and provides
some assurances that there would not be unnecessary vacancies.
Unfortunately, for all of the benefits of this approach, it has
some drawbacks that are not easily overcome-the most prob-
lematic of which is the Appointments Clause.140 Creating a pre-
sumption of reappointment could raise the question of whether
the President was actually making an appointment.
139. The table above, demonstrates that most reappointed judges serve a substantial
portion of their second term. See supra Table 1.
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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The Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution contains the
President's power to appoint judges to these courts and to other
offices. This clause vests appointment power as follows:
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pre-
sent concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Offic-
ers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein other-
wise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Court of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.141
If the President was not affirmatively making the appoint-
ments, it might be difficult to justify this approach as proper and
nonviolative of the Appointments Clause. Special Trial Judges
serve at the pleasure of the chief judge of the Tax Court and have
been held to be officers subject to the Appointments Clause by the
Supreme Court of the United States.142 Similarly, senior judges
serve at the request of the chief judge of the Tax Court. Affirma-
tive action in the form of selection or recall by the chief judge or
presidential nomination seems necessary for a proper appoint-
ment. Thus, simple presidential inaction may be inadequate to
justify reappointment, particularly against the historical back-
drop that intended for the judges to have less than life tenure,
even if reappointment was in fact de rigueur.
The second possible approach is to extend the initial term of a
Tax Court judge to twenty years. This approach would result in
less disruption to the Tax Court's operation than occurs under
current law and might reduce the number of instances in which
reappointment is an issue. Currently, many judges who sought
reappointment did not serve their entire second term. Extending
the length of the first term resolves this problem in many cases,
as the chart below demonstrates.
141. Id.
142. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
126-27 (1976) (limiting congressional authority to take the appointments power outside





Date of End Date End Date Judge
ial of I ntDa Date of re- of Re- Retired or Current
appoint- T ia appointment appointed Assumed Status
ment erm Term Senior
Status
John O. 9/1/1988 8/31/2003 8/12/2004 8/11/2019 N/A Chief JudgeColvin
Mary Ann 9/24/1982 9/23/1997 1117/1997 11/6/2012 N/A JudgeCohen _____
Maurice B. Senior Judge -
Foley 4/9/1995 4/8/2010 11/25/2011 11/24/2026 N/A Awaiting Re-
appointment
Senior Judge -
Joseph H. 2/6/1996 2/5/2011 10/18/2011 10/17/2026 N/A Awaiting Re-
G appointment
Joseph
Robert 4/22/2003 4/21/2018 N/A N/A N/A Judge
Goeke
Dadso 7/29/2008 7/29/2023 N/A N/A N/A Judge
James S. 7/3/1990 7/2/2005 11/2/2005 11/1/2020 N/A JudgeHalpern
Mark V. 6/30/2003 6/29/2018 N/A N/A N/A JudgeHolmes
Diane L. 6/13/2003 6/12/2018 N/A N/A N/A JudgeKroupa
L. Paige 4/6/1998 4/5/2013 N/A N/A N/A JudgeMarvel
Richard TP
MRrson 8/29/2008 8/28/2023 N/A N/A N/A JudgeMorrison
Elizabeth
Crewson 7/30/2008 7/29/2023 N/A N/A N/A Judge
Paris
Michael B. 3/9/1998 3/7/2013 N/A N/A N/A JudgeThornton
Juan F. Senior Judge -
Vasquez 5/1/1995 4/30/2010 10/13/2011 10/12/2026 N/A Awaiting Re-
appointment
Thomas B Senior Judge
Wells 10/13/1986 10/12/2001 10/10/2001 10/9/2016 N/A (recalled
1/1/2011)
Robert A. 4/23/2003 4/22/2018 N/A N/A N/A JudgeWherry Jr.
Renato Senior Judge
Beghe 3/26/1991 3/25/2006 N/A N/A 2/28/2003 (recalled2/28/2003)
Herbert L. Senior Judge
Chabot 4/3/1978 4/2/1993 10/20/1993 10/19/2008 6/30/2001 (recalled6/30/2001)
Carolyn P. Senior Judge
Chiechi ' 10/1/1992 9/30/2007 N/A N/A 9/30/2007 (recalledh 9/30/2007)
143. See Judges, U.S. TAX COURT, http://www.taxcourt.gov/judges.htm (last visited Dec.
12, 2011) (providing the information used to compile this table).
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Therefore, extending the length of the judicial term for Tax
Court judges would address many of the problems relating to ex-
piring terms. However, not all of the judges retire before the end
of their second term, and many of the more recently appointed
judges began their service at the Tax Court at a younger age,
which equates to potentially longer judicial careers. Assuming
their careers as attorneys will be productive and offer benefits
and experience that makes them more efficient judges, this solu-
tion is far less efficient and beneficial. Especially since reap-
pointment could be available or prohibited in conjunction with a
longer term. As a result, simply extending the term to twenty
years is not an ideal solution.
Moreover, extending the term for Tax Court judges to twenty
years would take the Tax Court further out of step from the rest
Howard A. Senior Judge
Dawson, Jr. 8/21/1962 6/1/1970 6/211970 6/1/1985 6/211985 (recalled6/2/1985)
Senior Judge
Joel Gerber 6/18/1984 6/17/1999 12/15/2000 12114/2015 6/1/2006 (recalled
6/1/2006)
arryAllen 4/Senior Judge
Harrye 4/22/2003 4/21/2018 N/A N/A 5/30/2009 (recalledHaines 5/30/2009)
Julian I. Senior Judge
Jacobs 3/30/1984 3/29/1999 N/A N/A 3/30/1999 (recalled3/30/1999)
Senior Judge
David Laro 11/2/1992 11/1/2007 N/A N/A 11/1/2007 (recalled
11/1/2007)
Arthur L. Senior Judge
Nims, III 6/29/1979 6/28/1994 N/A N/A 6/1/1992 (recalled6/1/1992)
Robert Paul Senior Judge
Ruwe 11/20/1987 11/19/2002 N/A N/A 11/19/2002 (recalled11/19/2002)
Laurece J.Senior JudgeLaurce J 11/23/1987 11/2212002 N/A N/A 11/22/2002 (recalled
11/2212002)
Stephen J Senior Judge
Swifth 8/16/1983 8/15/1998 1211/2000 11/30/2015 9/8/2008 (recalledSwift9/8/2008)
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of the federal judiciary at a time when it is working to bring its
procedures into closer conformity with other federal courts."'
A third solution, which is the recommended solution, is to
change the statute relating to recall. For Tax Court judges whose
terms have expired, but who have expressed a desire to be reap-
pointed during the appropriate time, Congress should rewrite the
statute to permit the judge to be recalled with the same rights
and duties as a Tax Court judge, unless the President indicates
that the position will be left vacant or filled with another nomi-
nee. This approach is similar to that used by some states." Un-
der this approach, Tax Court judges whose terms have expired re-
tain the rights and powers of their office until a replacement is
named, the President announces an intention to not fill the posi-
tion, or the judge retires. This approach alleviates concerns about
violating the Appointments Clause because the chief judge of the
Tax Court would be recalling the judge, first appointed by the
President.
This solution would allow the Tax Court to have a full, or close
to full complement of judges to engage in review of important tax
issues coming before the court. It also provides the sitting Presi-
dent with the full discretion to reduce the number of sitting Tax
Court judges by simply indicating his or her intention to not fill
the vacancy. In cases where the President intended to cut the
staffing of the court and made that intention clear at the expira-
tion of a judge's term, recall as a senior judge would be at the dis-
cretion of the chief judge of the Tax Court, without any more
power than currently exists. In addition, this solution would al-
low the President to choose to fill a vacancy created by the expira-
tion of a judge's term with a nominee that the President believes
to be more qualified, just as is the case now.
144. See Press Release, U.S. Tax Court, Notice of Proposed Amendments to Rules (Dec.
10, 2010), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/122010.pdf (explaining change to
business hours, from closing on legal holidays in the District of Columbia to closing on fed-
eral holidays).
145. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 271.01 (West 2011). ("Judges may serve until their succes-
sors are appointed and qualify. They shall be selected on the basis of their experience with
and knowledge of taxation and tax laws."). Judges in Minnesota are appointed by the gov-
ernor with the advice and consent of the state senate. Id.
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The statute should be revised to clarify that the additional
powers as senior judge last only so long as the expired term re-
mains unfilled. Failing to define the length of a senior judge's
powers would expand the powers of senior judges generally and
might be viewed as an unintentional expansion of powers. The
judge whose term expired retains full rights and powers only un-
til a nomination and confirmation of that judge or a replacement
occurs and the judicial position remains subject to presidential
appointment. This approach is intended only to allow the Tax
Court to continue its work at optimal levels until the President
makes an appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The proposed changes should not result in structural changes to
the Tax Court's normal course of operations.
CONCLUSION
Until recently, the Tax Court had three vacancies for which
President Obama had nominated the sitting judge for reappoint-
ment. Currently, four vacancies exist with three nominees await-
ing confirmation and other judges' terms set to expire before the
next presidential election.
Providing a statutory mechanism to maintain a full comple-
ment of judges improves the quality and timeliness of justice from
the Tax Court. Although judges appointed to the Tax Court gen-
erally have significant tax experience, there is still a learning
curve for sitting on the bench. The Tax Court benefits from judges
who can bring experienced views to the court's cases and confer-
ences. This is best accomplished by adopting an approach to ap-
pointing and reappointing these judges that ensures qualifica-
tions trump politics.
Recent experiences demonstrate that even when politics are
brought in to the appointment process, the appointment process
is able to protect itself. Politics are merely a symptom, not the
problem. However, the reappointment process is not working, and
the failure to timely reappoint Tax Court judges at the expiration
of their terms causes unnecessary disruption in the court's opera-
tion. Small changes to the Tax Court's operating statutes could
allow the court to continue with little change and without the
judges losing the ability to perform all of their normal functions,
even if a time gap occurs between the expiration of their first
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term and the beginning of their second term. These changes make
the court more effective and perhaps increase its attractiveness to
potential nominees.

